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Abstract—We consider the shortest path routing (SPR) of a net-
work with stochastically time varying link metrics under potential
adversarial attacks. Due to potential denial of service attacks,
the distributions of link states could be stochastic (benign) or
adversarial at different temporal and spatial locations. Without
any a priori, designing an adaptive SPR protocol to cope with
all possible situations in practice optimally is a very challenging
issue. In this paper, we present the first solution by formulating
it as a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem. By introducing a
novel control parameter into the exploration phase for each
link, a martingale inequality is applied in the our combinatorial
adversarial MAB framework. As such, our proposed algorithms
could automatically detect features of the environment within
a unified framework and find the optimal SPR strategies with
almost optimal learning performance in all possible cases over
time. Moreover, we study important issues related to the practical
implementation, such as decoupling route selection with multi-
path route probing, cooperative learning among multiple sources,
the “cold-start” issue and delayed feedback of our algorithm.
Nonetheless, the proposed SPR algorithms can be implemented
with low complexity and they are proved to scale very well with
the network size. Comparing to existing approaches in a typical
network scenario under jamming attacks, our algorithm has a
65.3% improvement of network delay given a learning period
and a 81.5% improvement of learning duration under a specified
network delay.
Index Terms—Shortest Path Routing, Online learning, jam-
ming, stochastic and adversarial multi-armed bandits
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortest path routing (SPR) is a basic functionality of
networks to route packets from sources to destinations. Con-
sider a network with known topology deployed in a wireless
environment, where the link qualities vary stochastically with
time. As security is critical to network performance, it is
vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks. For example, a mali-
cious attacker may perform a denial of service (DoS) attack
by jamming in a selected area of links or creating routing
worm [1] to cause severe congestions over the network. As
a result, the link metrics for the SPR (e.g., link delays) are
hard to predict. Although the source can measure links by
sending traceroute probing packets along selected paths, it
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is hard to obtain an accurate link measurement by a single
trial due to noise, inherent dynamics of links (e.g., fading and
short-term interference, etc.) and the unpredictable adversarial
behaviors (e.g., DoS attack on traffic and jamming attack, etc.).
Compared with the classic SPR problem where the assumed
average link metrics is a known priori, the source is necessary
to learn about the link metrics over time.
A fair amount of SPR algorithms have been proposed by
considering either the stochastically distributed link metrics
[2], [4], [5] (i.i.d. distributed) or security issues where all
link metrics are assumed to be adversarially distributed [6]–
[8] (non-i.i.d. distributed) that can vary in an arbitrary way by
attackers. In particular, the respective online learning problems
fit into the stochastic Multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem
[12] and the adversarial MAB problem [11] perfectly. The
main idea is, by probing each link along with the balance
between “exploration” and “exploitation” of sets of routes
over time, true average link metrics will gradually be learned
and the optimal SPR can be found by minimizing the term
“regret” that qualifies the learning performance, i.e., the gap
between routes selected by the SPR algorithm and the optimal
one known in hindsight, accumulated over time. A known
fact is that stochastic MAB and adversarial MAB have the
optimal regrets O(log(t)) [12] and O(√t) [11] over time t,
respectively. Obviously, the learning performance of stochastic
MAB is much better than that of adversarial MAB.
As we know, the assumption of the known nature of the
environments, i.e., stochastic or adversarial, in most existing
works is very restrictive in describing practical network en-
vironments. On the one hand, existing SPR protocols may
perform poorly in practice. Consider a network deployed in a
potentially hostile environment, the mobility pattern, attacking
approaches and strengths, numbers and locations of attackers
are often unrevealed. In this case, most likely, certain portions
of links may (or may not) suffer from denial of service
attackers that are adversarial, while the unaffected others are
stochastically distributed. To design an optimal SPR algorithm,
the adoption of the typical adversarial MAB model [6]–[8] on
all links will lead to undesirable learning performance (large
regrets) in finding the SPR, since a great portion of links can
be benign as the link states are still stochastically distributed.
On the other hand, applying stochastic MAB model [2],
[4], [5] will face practical implementation issues, even though
no adversarial behavior exists. In almost all practical net-
works (e.g., ad hoc and sensor networks), the commonly
seen occasionally disturbing events would make the stochastic
distributed link metrics contaminated. These include the burst
traffic injection, the jitter effect of electronmagnetic waves,
periodic battery replacements, and the unexpected routing
table corruptions and reconfigurations, etc. In this case, the
link metric distributions will not be i.i.d. for a small portion
of time during the whole learning process. Thus, it is unclear
whether the stochastic MAB theory can still be applied,
how it affects the learning performance and to what extend
the contamination is negligible. Therefore, the design of the
SPR protocol without any prior knowledge of the operating
environment is very challenging.
In this paper, we propose a novel adaptive online-learning
based SPR protocol to address this challenging issue at the first
attempt and it achieves near optimal learning performance in
all different situations within a unified online-learning frame-
work. The proposed algorithm neither needs to distinguish
the stochastic and adversarial MAB problems nor needs to
know the time horizon of running the protocol. Our idea is
based on the well-known EXP3 algorithm from adversarial
MAB [11] by introducing a novel control parameter into the
exploration probability to detect the metrics evolutions of each
link. In contrast to hop-by-hop routing where intermediate
node is responsible to decide the next route, our online routing
decision is made at the endhost (i.e, source nodes) that is
capable to select a globally optimal path. Owing to the lack of
link quality knowledge, the limited observation of the network
from the endhost makes the online-learning based SPR very
challenging. Therefore, the regret grows not only with time,
but also with the network size. Moreover, to further accelerate
the learning process in practical large-scale networks, we need
to study the following important issues: each endhost in every
time slot decouples route selection and probing by sending
“smart” probing packets (these packets do not carry any useful
data) over multiple paths to measure link metrics along with
the selected path in the network, cooperative learning among
multiple endhosts, and the “cold-start” and delayed feedback
issues in practical deployments. Our main contributions are
summarized as follows:
1) We design the first adaptive SPR protocol to bring the
stochastic and adversarial MABs into a unified framework
with promising practical applications in unknown network
environments. The environments are generally categorized into
four typical regimes, where our proposed SPR algorithms are
shown to achieve almost optimal regret performance in all
regimes and are resilient to different kinds of attacks.
2) We extend our algorithm to accelerated learning and
see a 1/m-factor reduction in regret for a probing rate of m.
We also consider the practical “cold-start” issue of the SPR
algorithms, i.e., when the endhost is unaware of the m and
total number of links n at the beginning and the sensitiveness
of the algorithm to that lacked information, and the delayed
feedback issue.
3) The proposed algorithms can be implemented by dy-
namic programming, where its time and space complexities
is comparable to the classic Dijkstra’s algorithm. Importantly,
they achieve optimal regret bounds with respect to the network
size.
4) We conduct diversified experiments on both real trace-
driven and synthetic datasets and demonstrate that all advan-
tages of the algorithms are real and can be applied in practice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses related works. Section III describes the problem
formulation. Section IV studies the single-source adaptive
optimal SPR problem with solid performance analysis. In
Section V, we study the accelerated learning and practical
implementation issues. Section VI discusses the computation-
ally efficient implementation of AOSPR-EXP3++. Section VII
conducts numerical experiments. Important proofs for single-
source and accelerated learning SPR algorithms are put in
Section VIII and Section IX, respectively. The paper concludes
in Section X.
II. RELATED WORK
Online learning-based routing has been proposed to deal
with networks in dynamically changing environments, es-
pecially in wireless ad hoc networks with fixed topology.
Some existing solutions focus on the hop-by-hop optimization
of route selections, e.g., [3], [5], and references therein.
Meanwhile, most of the other works consider the much more
challenging endhost-based routing, e.g., [2], [4], [8], [24]. In
[3], reinforcement learning (RL) techniques are used to update
the link-level metrics. It is worth pointing out that RL is
generally targeted at a broader set of learning problems in
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) [17]. It is well-known
that such learning algorithms can guarantee optimality only
asymptotically (to infinity), which cannot be relied upon
in mission-critical applications. MAB problems constitute a
special class of MDPs, for which the regret learning frame-
work is generally viewed as more effective both in terms of
convergence and computational complexity for the finite time
optimality solutions. Thus, the use of MAB models is highly
identified. If path measurements are available for a set of
independent paths, it belongs to the classic MAB problem. If
link measurements are available such that the dependent paths
can share this information, it is named as the combinatorial
semi-bandit [20] problems. Obviously, the exploitation of
sharing measurements of overlapping links among different
paths can accelerate learning and result in much lower regrets
and better scalability [20].
Importantly, existing works are mainly based on two types
of MAB models: adversarial MAB [6]–[8] and stochastic
MAB [2], [4], [5], [24]. The work in [6] studied the minimal
delay SPR against an oblivious adversary, and the regret
is a suboptimal O(t2/3). The throughput-competitive route
selection against an adaptive adversary was studied in [7] with
regret O(t2/3), which yields the worst routing performance.
Gyo¨rgy et al. [8] provided a complete routing framework
under the oblivious adversary attack, and it is based on
both link and path measurements with order-optimal regrets
O(t1/2). The works in [2], [4], [5], [24] considered benign
environments to be better modeled by the stochastic setting
without adversarial events, where link weights follow some
unknown stochastic (i.i.d.) distributions. Bhorkar et al. [5]
consider routing based on each link (hop-by-hop), who has
an order-optimal regret O(logt). The first solution for SPR as
the stochastic combinatorial semi-bandit MAB problem was
seen in [4], and it indicates a regret O(n4logt) given the
number of links n. As noticed, the regret of endhost-based
routing greatly increases with the network size. [2] probed
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the least measured links for i.i.d. distributed links and it had
considered the practical delayed feedback issue, which has
improved regrets compared with [4]. Although the algorithm
could handle temporally-correlated links, it is not suitable for
the adversarial link condition. In [24], the author proposed an
adaptive SPR algorithm under stochastically varying link states
that achieves an O(k4logt) regret, where k is the dimension
of the path set.
The stochastic and adversarial MABs have co-existed in
parallel for almost two decades. Recently, [15] tried to bring
them together in the classic MAB framework. Our current
work is motivated by [15] by using a novel exploration
parameter over each channel to detect its evolving patterns,
i.e., stochastic, contaminated, or adversarial, but they do not
generalize their idea to describe general environmental sce-
narios (No mixed adversarial and stochastic regime, which is
very typical scenario) with potential engineering and security
applications. Our current work uses the idea of introduc-
ing the novel exploration parameter [15] into our special
combinatorial semi-bandit MAB problem by exploiting the
link dependency among different paths, which is a nontrivial
and much harder problem. This new framework avoids the
computational inefficiency issue for general combinatorial
adversary bandit problems as indicated in [21] [13]. It achieves
a regret bound of order O(kr
√
tn lnn), which only has a
factor of O(
√
kr) factor off when compared to the optimal
O(
√
krtn lnn) bound in the combinatorial adversary bandit
setting [20]. However, we do believe that the regret bound
in our framework is the optimal one for the exponential
weight (e.g. EXP3 [11]) type of algorithm settings in the
sense that the algorithm is computationally efficient. Thus,
our work is also a first computationally efficient combinatorial
MAB algorithm for general unknown environments1. What is
more surprising and encouraging, in the stochastic regimes
(including the contaminated stochastic regime), our algorithms
achieve a regret bound of order O˜(nk log (t)∆ ). In the sense
of channel numbers n and size of links within each strategy
k, this is the best result to date for combinatorial stochastic
bandit problems [16]. Please note that in [4], they have a
regret bound of order O(n
4 log (t)
∆ ); in [23], the regret bound
is O(n
3 log (t)
∆ ); in [24], regret bound is O(
k4 log (t)
∆ ) and in
[25], the regret bound is O(n2 log3 (t)∆ ). Thus, our proposed
algorithms are order optimal with respect to n and k for all
different regimes, which indicates the optimal scalability for
general wireless communication systems or networks.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Network Model
We consider the given network modeled by a directed
acyclic graph with a set of vertices connected by edges, and
sources vertices have streams of data packets to send to the
distinguished destination vertices. Formally, let V denote the
set of nodes and E the set of links with |E| = n. For any
given source-destination pair (s, d), let P denote the set of
1 As noticed, the stochastic combinatorial bandit problem does no have this
issue as indicated in [21] [16].
all candidate paths as routing strategies belongs to (s, d) with
|P| = N . We represent each path i, as a routing strategy, has
i ∈ P ⊂ {0, 1}n. Overlaps (sharing links) between different
paths are allowed. Let ki denote the length of each path i and k
denote the maximum length of path(s) within P . Thus, the size
of N is upper bounded by nk, which is exponentially large
to the number of edges n, and therefore a computationally
efficient algorithm is desirable.
At each time slot t, depending on the traffic and link quality,
each edge e may experience a different unknown varying link
weight ℓt(e). A packet traversed over the chosen path have a
sum of weights ℓt(i) equals to
∑
e∈i ℓt(e) of links composing
the path. If there are adversary events imposed on a link (or
the related routers, which will finally affect the link weight), it
is attacked. We denote the respective set and number of these
attacked links by Ea and ka. We assume the link weights to be
additive, where the typical additive metric is link delays (there
are others, e.g., log of delivery ratio). We do not make any
assumption on the distribution of each ℓt(e), ∀e ∈ E, it can,
by default, follow some unknown stochastic process (i.i.d.),
and coud be attacked arbitrarily by diversified attackers (non-
i.i.d.) that is different across different links. Without loss of
generality (W.l.o.g), we transform the link weights such that
ℓt(e) ∈ [0, 1] for all e and t, and there is a single attacker
launches all attacks.
B. Problem Description
The main task for a given source-destination pair is to find
a path i ∈ P with minimized path weights ℓt(i) over time.
If each link weight ℓt(e) is known at every time slot, the
problem can be efficiently solved by classic routing solutions
(e.g., Dijkstra’s algorithm). Otherwise, it necessitates online
learning-based approaches.
W.l.o.g, we consider source routing, where source s period-
ically sends probes along the potential paths to measure the
network and adjust its choices over time. We use the link-level
measurements to record the link weights as in traceroute on
the probed paths, i.e., if path i is probed at the beginning of
time slot t, all its link weights are observed at the end of t.
If multi-path probing is allowed with a budget of Mt paths at
time t, all the probed path iˆ1, ..., iˆMt will be traced out and
their link weights are observed. Let Lt(i) =
∑t
s=1 ℓt(i) =∑t
s=1
∑
e∈i ℓs(e) be the cumulative weight up to t for a
selected path i. Then, i∗ ∆= argmini∈P {Lt(i)} denotes the
expected minimum weight path. Let It denotes a particular
path chosen at time slot t from P , then for a particular
SPR algorithm, the cumulative weight up to time slot t is
Lˆt (Is) =
∑t
s=1 ℓs (Is) =
∑t
s=1
∑
e∈Is ℓs (e). Our goal is
to jointly select a path Is (and a set of probing path if
allowed, i.e., i ∈ Ms) at each time slot s up to time t
(s = 1, 2, ..., t) such that Is converges to i∗ as fast as possible
in all different situations. Specifically, the performance of the
SPR algorithm is qualified by the regret R(t), defined as
the difference between the selected paths by the proposed
algorithm and the expected minimum weight path up to t time
slots. Note that R(t) is a random variable because It depends
on link measurement. We use Et[·] to denote expectations on
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Fig. 1: SPR in Different Regimes of Unknown Environments
realization of all strategies as random variables up to round t.
Therefore, the expected regret can be written as
R(t) = E[
t∑
s=1
Es[
∑
e∈Is
ℓs(e)]]−min
i∈P
(E[
t∑
s=1
Es[
∑
e∈i
ℓs(e)]]). (1)
The goal of the algorithm is to minimize the regret.
C. The Four Regimes of Network Environments
Since our algorithm does not need to know the nature of
the environments, different characteristics of the environments
will affect its performance differently. We categorize them into
four typical regimes as shown in Fig. 1.
1) Adversarial Regime: In this regime, there is an attacker
attacks (e.g., send interfering power and corrupt routers by
worms, etc.) over all n links such that link weights suffered
completely (See Fig.1 (a)) that lead to metric value (e.g.
link delay) loss. Note that the adversarial regime as a classic
model of the well known non-stochastic MAB problem [11]
implies that the attacker launches attack in every time slot. It
is the most general setting and the other three regimes can be
regarded as special cases of the adversarial regime.
Attack Model: Different attack philosophies will lead to
different level of effectiveness. We focus on the following two
type of jammers in the adversarial regime:
a) Oblivious attacker: an oblivious attacker attacks different
links with different attacking strength as a result of different
data rate reductions, which is independent of the past commu-
nication records it might have observed.
b) Adaptive attacker: an adaptive attacker selects its attack-
ing strength on the targeted (sub)set of links by utilizing its
past experience and observation of the previous communica-
tion records. It is very powerful and can infer the SPR protocol
and can launch attacks with different level of strength over
a subset of links or routers during a single time slot based
on the historical monitoring records. As shown in a recent
work [9], no bandit algorithm can guarantee a sublinear regret
o(t) against an adaptive adversary with unbounded memory,
because the adaptive adversary can mimic the behavior of
SPR protocol to attack, which leads to a linear regret (the
attack can not be defended). Therefore, we consider a more
practical θ-memory-bounded adaptive adversary [9] model. It
is an adversary constrained to loss functions that depends only
on the θ + 1 most recent strategies.
2) Stochastic Regime: In this regime, the transceiver is
communicating over n stochastic links as shown in Fig.1
(b). The link weights ℓt(e), ∀e ∈ 1, ..., n of each link e
are sampled independently from an unknown distribution that
depends on e, but not on t. We use µe = E [ℓt(e)] to denote
the expected loss of link e. We define link e as the best link
if µ(e) = mine′{µ(e′)} and suboptimal link otherwise; let
e∗ denote some best link. For each link e, define the gap
∆(e) = µ(e) − µ(e∗); let ∆e = mine:∆(e)>0 {∆(e)} denote
the minimal gap of links. The regret can be rewritten as
R(t) =
∑n
e=1
E [Nt(e)]∆(e). (2)
Note that we can calculate the regret either from the perspec-
tive of links e ∈ 1, ..., n or from the perspective of strategies
i ∈ P . However, because of the set of strategies (paths) grows
exponentially with respect to n and it does not exploit the link
dependency between different strategies, we can calculate the
regret from links, where tight regret bounds are achievable.
3) Mixed Adversarial and Stochastic Regime: This regime
assumes that the attacker only attacks ka out of k active links
at each time slot shown in Fig.1 (c). There is always a ka/k
portion of links under adversarial attack while the other (k −
ka)/k portion is stochastically distributed.
Attack Model: We consider the same attack model as in
the adversarial regime. The difference here is that the attacker
only attacks a subset of links of size ka over the total k links.
4) Contaminated Stochastic Regime: The definition of the
contaminated stochastic regime comes from many practical
observations that only a few links (or routers) and time slots
are exposed to adversary. In this regime, for the oblivious
attacker, it selects some slot-link pairs (t, e) as “locations”
to attack before the SPR starts, while the remaining link
weights are generated the same as in the stochastic regime.
We can introduce and define the attacking strength parameter
ζ ∈ [0, 1/2). After certain τ timslots, for all t > τ the total
number of contaminated locations of each suboptimal link up
to time t is t∆(e)ζ and the number of contaminated locations
of each best link is t∆eζ. We call a contaminated stochastic
regime moderately contaminated, if ζ is at most 1/4, we can
prove that for all t > τ on the average over the stochasticity
of the loss sequence the adversary can reduce the gap of every
link by at most one half.
IV. SINGLE-SOURCE ADAPTIVE OPTIMAL SPR
A. Coupled Probing and Routing
This section develops an SPR algorithm for a single source.
The design philosophy is that the source collects the link
delays of the previously chosen paths, based on which it
can decide the next time slot routing strategy. The main
difficulty is that it requires the algorithm to appropriately
balance between exploitation and exploration. On the one
hand, such an algorithm needs to keep exploring the best set
of paths; on the other hand, it needs to exploit the already
selected best set of paths so that they are not under utilized.
We describe Algorithm 1, namely AOSPR-EXP3++, a vari-
ant based on EXP3 algorithm, whose performance in the four
regimes is proved to be asymptotically optimal. Our new
algorithm uses the fact that when link delays of the chosen
path are revealed, it also provides useful information about
other paths with shared common links. During each time slot,
we assign a link weight that is dynamically adjusted based
on the link delays revealed to the source. The weight of a
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Algorithm 1 AOSPR-EXP3++: An MAB-based Algorithm for
AOSPR
Input: n, k, t, and See text for definition of ηt and ξt(e).
Initialization: Set initial link losses ∀e ∈ [1, n], ℓ˜0(e) = 0.
Then the initial link and path weights ∀e ∈ [1, n], w0(e) = 1
and ∀i ∈ [1, N ],W0(i) = k, respectively.
Set: βt=12
√
lnn
tn ; εt (e)=min
{
1
2n , βt, ξt (e)
}
, ∀e ∈ [1, n].
for time slot t = 1, 2, ... do
1: The source selects a path It at random according to the
probability ρt(i), ∀i ∈ P , with ρt(i) computed as follows:
ρt(i) =


(1−∑ne=1 εt(e)) wt−1(i)Wt−1 +∑
e∈i
εt(e) if i ∈ C
(1−∑ne=1 εt(e)) wt−1(i)Wt−1 if i /∈ C(3)
2: The source computes the probability ρ˜t(e), ∀e ∈ E, as
ρ˜t(e) =
∑
i:e∈i ρt(i) = (1−
∑n
e=1 εt(e))
∑
i:e∈i wt−1(i)
Wt−1
+
∑
e∈i εt(e) |{i ∈ C : e ∈ i}| .
(4)
3: Observe the suffered link loss ℓt−1(e), ∀e ∈ It, and
update its estimated value by ℓ˜t(e) = ℓt(e)ρ˜t(e) , ∀e ∈ It.
Otherwise, ℓ˜t(e) = 0, ∀e /∈ It.
4: The source updates all the weights as
wt (e) = wt−1 (e) e−ηtℓ˜t(e) = e−ηtL˜t(e) and
w¯t (i) =
∏
e∈i wt(e) = w¯t−1 (i) e−ηtℓ˜t(i), where
L˜t(e) = L˜t−1(e) + ℓ˜t−1(e), ℓ˜t−1(e) =
∑
e∈i ℓ˜t−1(e) and
L˜t(i) = L˜t−1(i) + ℓ˜t−1(i). The sum of weights of all
strategies is calculated as Wt =
∑
i∈P
w¯t (i).
end for
path is determined by the product of weights of all links. Our
algorithm has two control parameters: the learning rate ηt and
the exploration parameter εt(e) for each link e. To facilitate
the adaptive and optimal SPR without the knowledge about
the nature of the environments, the crucial innovation is the
introduction of exploration parameter ξt(e) into εt(e) for each
link e, which is tuned individually for each arm depending on
the past observations.
Let N denote the total number of strategies at the source
side. A set of covering strategy is defined to ensure that each
link is sampled sufficiently often. It has the property that for
each link e, there is a strategy i ∈ C such that e ∈ i. Since
there are only n links and each strategy includes k links, we set
|C| = ⌈nk ⌉. As such, there is no-overlapping among different
paths in the set of the covering strategy to maximize the
covering range. The value
∑
e∈i εt(e) means the randomized
exploration probability for each strategy i ∈ C, which is
the summation of each link e’s exploration probability εt (e)
that belongs to the strategy i. The introduction of
∑
e∈i εt (e)
ensures ρt(i) ≥
∑
e∈i εt(e) so that a mixture of exponential
weight distribution and uniform distribution [14].
In the following discussion, we show that tuning only the
learning rate ηt is sufficient to control and obtain the regret
of the AOSPR-EXP3++ in the adversarial regime, regardless
of the choice of exploration parameter ξt(e). Then we show
that tuning only the exploration parameter ξt(e) is sufficient
to control the regret of AOSPR-EXP3++ in the stochastic
regimes regardless of the choice of ηt, as long as ηt ≥ βt.
To facilitate the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm without knowing
about the nature of environments, we can apply the two
control parameters simultaneously by setting ηt = βt and
use the control parameter ξt(e) in the stochastic regimes
such that it can achieve the optimal “root-t” regret in the
adversarial regime and almost optimal “logarithmic-t” regret
in the stochastic regime (though with a suboptimal power in
the logarithm).
B. Performance Results in Different Regimes
We present the regret performance of our proposed AOSPR-
EXP3++ algorithm in different regimes as follows. The analy-
sis involves with martingale theory and some special concen-
tration inequalities, which are put in Section VII.
1) Adversarial Regime: We first show that tuning ηt is
sufficient to control the regret of AOSPR-EXP3++ in the
adversarial regime, which is a general result that holds for
all other regimes.
Theorem 1. Under the oblivious adversary, no matter how
the status of the links change (potentially in an adversarial
manner), for ηt = βt and any ξt(e) ≥ 0, the regret of the
AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm for any t satisfies
R(t) ≤ 4k
√
tn lnn.
Note that Theorem 1 attains the same result as in [8] in the
adversarial regime for oblivious adversary, based on which we
get result for the adaptive adversary in the following.
Theorem 2. Under the θ-memory-bounded adaptive adver-
sary, no matter how the status of the links change (potentially
in an adversarial manner), for ηt = βt and any ξt(e) ≥ 0, the
regret of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm for any t satisfies
R(t) ≤ (θ + 1)(4k
√
n lnn)
2
3 t
2
3 + o(t
2
3 ).
2) Stochastic Regime: Now we show that for any ηt ≥ βt,
tuning the exploration parameters ξt(e) is sufficient to control
the regret of the algorithm in the stochastic regime. We also
consider a different way of tuning the exploration parameters
ξt(e) for practical implementation considerations. We begin
with an idealistic assumption that the gaps ∆(e), ∀e ∈ n is
known, just to give an idea of what is the best result we can
have and our general idea for all our proofs.
Theorem 3. Assume that the gaps ∆(e), ∀e ∈ n, are
known. Let t∗ be the minimal integer that satisfies t∗(e) ≥
4c2n ln (t∗(e)∆(e)2)
2
∆(e)4 ln(n)
. For any choice of ηt ≥ βt and any
c ≥ 18, the regret of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm with
ξt(a) =
c ln(t∆(e)2)
t∆(e)2
in the stochastic regime satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
k ln (t)2
∆(e)
)
+
∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)t∗(e)
= O
(
kn ln (t)2
∆e
)
+
∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O˜
(
n
∆(e)3
)
.
From the upper bound results, we note that the leading
constants k and n are optimal and tight as indicated in Com-
bUCB1 [16] algorithm. However, we have a factor of ln(t)
worse of the regret performance than the optimal “logarithmic-
t” regret as in [2], [4], [5], [12], [16], [24], where the
performance gap is trivially negligible (See numerical results
in Section VII).
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A Practical Implementation by Estimating the Gap: Because
of the gaps ∆(e), ∀e ∈ n can not be known in advance before
running the algorithm. Next, we show a more practical result
that uses the empirical gap as an estimate of the true gap. The
estimation process can be performed in background for each
link e that starts from the running of the algorithm, i.e.,
∆ˆt(e) = min
{
1,
1
t
(
L˜t(e)−min
e′
(L˜t(e
′))
)}
. (5)
This is a first algorithm that can be used in many real-world
applications.
Theorem 4. Let c ≥ 18 and ηt ≥ βt. Let t∗ be the
minimal integer that satisfies t∗ ≥ 4c2 ln (t∗)4nln(n) , and let t∗(e) =
max
{
t∗,
⌈
e1/∆(e)
2
⌉}
and t∗ = max{e∈n}t∗(e). The regret
of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm with ξt(e) = c(ln t)
2
t∆ˆt−1(e)
2 ,
termed as AOSPR-EXP3++AVG, in the stochastic regime satis-
fies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
k ln (t)3
∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)t∗(e)
= O
(
nk ln (t)3
∆e
)
+ nt∗.
From the theorem, we observe that factor of another ln(t)
worse of the regret performance when compared to the ideal-
istic case. Also, the additive constant t∗ in this theorem can
be very large. However, our experimental results show that a
minor modification of this algorithm achieves a comparable
performance with ComUCB1 [16] in the stochastic regime.
3) Mixed Adversarial and Stochastic Regime: The mixed
adversarial and stochastic regime can be regarded as a special
case of mixing adversarial and stochastic regimes. Since there
is always a jammer randomly attacking ka links out of the
total n links out of the total k links constantly over time, we
will have the following theorem for the AOSPR-EXP3++AVG
algorithm, which is a much more refined regret performance
bound than the general regret bound in the adversarial regime.
Theorem 5. Let c ≥ 18 and ηt ≥ βt. Let t∗ be the minimal
integer that satisfies t∗ ≥ 4c2 ln (t∗)4nln(n) , and Let t∗(e) =
max
{
t∗,
⌈
e1/∆(e)
2
⌉}
and t∗ = max{e∈n}t∗(e). The regret
of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm with ξt(e) = c(ln t)
2
t∆ˆt−1(e)
2 ,
termed as AOSPR-EXP3++AVG under oblivious jamming at-
tack, in the mixed stochastic and adversarial regime satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
(k−ka) ln (t)3
∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)t∗(e)
+4ka
√
tn lnn
= O
(
n(k−ka) ln (t)3
∆e
)
+ nt∗ +O
(
ka
√
tn lnn
)
.
Note that the results in Theorem 5 have better regret
performance than the results obtained by adversarial MAB
as shown in Theorem 1 and the adaptive SPR algorithm in
[7]. Similarly, we have the following result under adaptive
adversarial attack.
Theorem 6. Let c ≥ 18 and ηt ≥ βt. Let t∗ be the minimal
integer that satisfies t∗ ≥ 4c2 ln (t∗)4nln(n) , and Let t∗(e) =
max
{
t∗,
⌈
e1/∆(e)
2
⌉}
and t∗ = max{e∈n}t∗(e). The regret
of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm with ξt(e) = c(ln t)
2
t∆ˆt−1(e)
2 ,
termed as AOSPR-EXP3++AVG θ-memory-bounded adaptive
adversarial attack, in the mixed stochastic and adversarial
regime satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
(k−ka) ln (t)3
∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)t∗(e)
+(θ + 1)(4ka
√
n lnn)
2
3 t
2
3 + o(t
2
3 )
= O
(
(k−ka)n ln (t)3
∆e
)
+ nt∗ +O
(
(θ + 1)(ka
√
n lnn)
2
3 t
2
3
)
.
4) Contaminated Stochastic Regime: We show that the al-
gorithm AOSPR-EXP3++AVG can still retain “polylogarithmic-
t” regret in the contaminated stochastic regime. The follow-
ing is the result for the moderately contaminated stochastic
regime.
Theorem 7. Under the setting of all parameters given in
Theorem 3, for t∗(e) = max
{
t∗,
⌈
e4/∆(e)
2
⌉}
, where t∗ is
defined as before and t∗3 = max{e∈n}t∗(e), and the attacking
strength parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1/2) the regret of the AOSPR-
EXP3++ algorithm in the contaminated stochastic regime that
is contaminated after τ steps satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
k ln (t)3
(1−2ζ)∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)max{t∗(e), τ}.
= O
(
nk ln (t)3
(1−2ζ)∆e
)
+ nt∗3.
If ζ ∈ (1/4, 1/2), we find that the leading factor 1/(1 −
2ζ) is very large, which is severely contaminated. Now, the
obtained regret bound is not quite meaningful, which could
be much worse than the regret performance in the adversarial
regime for both oblivious and adaptive adversary.
V. ACCELERATED AOSPR ALGORITHM
This section focuses on the accelerated learning by multi-
path probing, cooperative learning between multiple source-
destination pairs and other practical issues. All important
proofs are put in Section VIII.
A. Multi-Path Probing for Adaptive Online SPR
Intuitively, probing multiple paths simultaneously would
offer the source more available information to make decisions,
which results in faster learning and smaller regret value. At
each time slot t, the source gets a budget 1 ≤ Mt ≤
N and picks a subsect Ot ⊆ {1, ..., N} of Mt paths to
probe and observe the link weights of these routes. Note
that the links weights that belong to the un-probed set of
paths P \ Ot are still unrevealed. Accordingly, we have the
probed and observed set of links O˜t with the simple property
e ∈ O˜t, ∀e ∈ i ∈ Ot. The proposed algorithm 2 is based
on Algorithm 1 with ωt−1(i) = wt−1(i)/Wt−1, ∀i ∈ P and
ωt−1(e) =
∑
i:e∈i wt−1(e)/Wt−1, ∀e ∈ E. The probability
̺t = (̺t(1), ..., ̺t(N)) of each observed path is computed as
̺t(i) = ρt(i) + (1− ρt(i)) Mt − 1
N − 1 , if i ∈ Ot, (6)
where a mixture of the new exploration probability (Mt −
1)/(N−1) is introduced and ρt(i) is defined in (3). Similarly,
the link probability ˜̺t = (˜̺t(1)..., ˜̺t(n)) is computed as
˜̺t(e) = ρ˜t(e) + (1− ρ˜t(e)) mt − 1
n− 1 , if e ∈ O˜t. (7)
Here, we have a link-level the new mixing exploration prob-
ability (mt − 1)/(n − 1) and ρ˜t(e) is defined in (4). The
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probing rate mt denotes the number of simultaneous probes
at time slot t. Assume the link weights measured by different
probes within the same time slot also satisfy the assumption
in Section II-A. The mixing probability (mt − 1)/(n − 1)
is informed by the source to all links along the probed and
observed paths over a total of n links of the probed path Mt is
a constant value for a network with fixed topology. The source
needs to know the number of n and gradually collect the value
of mt over time. Thus, the algorithm faces the problems of
“Cold-Start” and delayed feedback. The design of (6) and (7)
and the proof of all results in this section are non-trivial tasks
in our unified framework .
Algorithm 2 AOSPR-MP-EXP3++: Prediction with Multi-
Path Probing
Input: M1,M2, ...,, such that Mt ∈ P . Set βt, εt (e) , ξt (e)
at in Alg. 1. ∀i ∈ P , L˜0(i) = 0 and ∀e ∈ E, ℓ˜0(e) = 0.
for time slot t = 1, 2, ... do
1: Choose one path Ht according to ρt (3). Get advice
πHtt as the selected path. Sample Mt−1 additional paths
uniformly over N . Denote the set of sampled paths by
Ot, where Ht ∈ Ot and |Ot| =Mt. Let 1ht = 1{h∈Ot}.
2: Update the path probabilities ̺t(i) according to (6).
The loss of the observed path is
ℓ˜t(i) =
ℓt(i)
̺t(i)
1
h
t , ∀i ∈ Ot. (8)
3: Compute the probability of choosing each link ρ˜t(e)
that belongs to the selected path according to (4).
4: let 1(e)t = 1(e)e∈h∈Ot . Update the link probabilities
˜̺t(e) according to (7). The loss of the observed links are
ℓ˜t(e) =
ℓt(e)
˜̺t(e)
1(e)t, ∀e ∈ O˜t. (9)
5: Updates all weights wt (e) , w¯t (i) ,Wt as in Alg. 1.
end for
The Performance Results of Multi-path Probing in the Four
Regimes: If mt is a constant or lower bounded by m, we have
the following results.
Theorem 8. Under the oblivious attack with the same setting
of Theorem 1, the regret of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm in
the accelerated learning with probing rate m satisfies
R(t) ≤ 4k
√
t
n
m
lnn.
Theorem 9. Under the θ-memory-bounded adaptive attack
with the same setting of Theorem 2, the regret of the AOSPR-
EXP3++ algorithm in the accelerated learning with probing
rate m satisfies
R(t) ≤ (θ + 1)(4k
√
n
m
lnn)
2
3 t
2
3 + o(t
2
3 ).
We consider the practical implementation in the stochastic
regime by estimating the gap as in the (5), and the result under
accelerated learning is given as:
Theorem 10. With all other parameters hold as in Theorem
4, the regret of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm with ξt(e) =
c(ln t)2
mt∆ˆt−1(e)
2 in the accelerated learning with probing rate m, in
the stochastic regime satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
k ln (t)3
m∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)t∗(e)
= O
(
nk ln (t)3
m∆e
)
+ nt∗.
Theorem 11. With all other parameters hold as in Theorem
5, the regret of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm with ξt(e) =
c(ln t)2
mt∆ˆt−1(e)
2 under oblivious jamming attack in the accelerated
learning with probing rate m, in the mixed stochastic and
adversarial regime satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
(k−ka) ln (t)3
m∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)t∗(e)
+4ka
√
t nm lnn
= O
(
n(k−ka) ln (t)3
m∆e
)
+ nt∗ +O
(
ka
√
t nm lnn
)
.
Theorem 12. With all other parameters hold as in Theorem
6, the regret of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm with ξt(e) =
c(ln t)2
mt∆ˆt−1(e)
2 under the θ-memory-bounded adaptive attack in
the accelerated learning with probing rate m, in the mixed
stochastic and adversarial regime satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
(k−ka) ln (t)3
m∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)t∗(e)
+(θ + 1)(4ka
√
n
m lnn)
2
3 t
2
3 + o(t
2
3 )
= O
(
n(k−ka) ln (t)3
m∆e
)
+ nt∗ +O
(
(θ + 1)(ka
√
n
m lnn)
2
3 t
2
3
)
.
Theorem 13. With all other parameters hold as in The-
orem 7, the regret of the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm in the
accelerated learning with probing rate m in the contaminated
stochastic regime satisfies
R(t) ≤
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
O
(
k ln (t)3
(1−2ζ)∆(e)
)
+
n∑
e=1,∆(e)>0
∆(e)max{t∗(e), τ}.
= O
(
nk ln (t)3
m(1−2ζ)∆e
)
+ nt∗3.
B. Multi-Source Learning for SPR Routing
So far we have focused on a single source-destination pair.
Now, we turn to study the more practical multi-source learning
with multiple source-destination pairs {1, ..., S} (set S = m
to ease comparison), which may also accelerate learning if
sources can share information. Depending on the approach of
information sharing, we consider two typical cases: coordi-
nated probing and uncoordinated probing. Both cases assume
the sources share link measurements. The difference is the
selection of probing path is either centralized or distributed.
In the coordinated probing case, the probing path are
selected globally either by a cluster head or different sources.
We refer the algorithm as AOSPR-CP-EXP3++. Given total of
Mt source-destination pairs at time t, the Mt probing paths
are sequentially chosen which satisfies the probing rate of one
path per source-destination pair. It is identical to the multi-path
probing case except that now the candidate paths are not from
one’s own path, but from all source-destination pairs. Thus,
the same results hold as in the Theorem 8-Theorem 13.
Theorem 14. The regret upper bounds in all different
regimes for AOSPR-CP-EXP3++ hold the same as in Theorem
8-Theorem 13.
In the uncoordinated probing case, the probing paths are
selected in a distributed manner using AOSPR-EXP3++. We
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denote the algorithm as AOSPR-UP-EXP3++. As such, links
are no longer evenly measured since some links may be
covered by more source-destination pairs than others. By
applying a linear program to estimate the low bound on the
least probed link over time t, we have a scale factor κ¯ that
defines the dependency degree of overlapping paths. Then, we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 15. The regret upper bounds in all different
regimes for AOSPR-UP-EXP3++ are: if κ¯ = 1, it is equivalent
to the single source-destination pair case, the same results hold
as in the Theorem 1-Theorem 7; if κ¯ = m, it is equivalent
to the accelerated learning of multi-path probing case where
the regret results hold by the substitution of m by κ¯ in the
Theorem 8-Theorem 13.
C. The Cold-Start and Delayed feedback Issues
1) The Cold-Start Issue: Before the initialization of the
algorithm, the source does not know the number of links n
and the simultaneous probed number of links mt, which is
demanded in the probing probability calculation in (7). Thus,
the algorithm faces the “cold-start” problem. Note that the
N can be a complete collection of paths of the source, it
must contain a set of covering strategy C′ where the whole
links of the network is covered and the total number of links
n is acquirable. Let M = mint{M1,M2, ...,Mt, ...} denote
the minimal probed path from source over time. We have the
following Corollary 16 that indicates how long it takes for the
AOSPR-MP-EXP3++ algorithm to work normally.
Corollary 16. It takes at most NM timslots for the AOSPR-
MP-EXP3++ algorithm to finish the “Cold-Start” phase and
start working normally.
Proof: Denote the event of the probability that source
node probes the paths uniformly over the N possible paths at
each time slot as X and the event Y of the probability that
the number of probed links over total of n links. Take the fol-
lowing conditional probability we have E[X ] = E[X |Y ]E[Y ],
where E[X ] = E[Mt]N and E[Y ] =
E[mt]
n . Due to the
potential dependency among different paths, E[X |Y ] ≤ 1.
Thus, E[Y ] ≤ E[X ], i.e., E[mt]n ≤ E[Mt]N , which indicates
N
Mt
≥ nmt , ∀t. Since each link has probability p = mtn to
be probed at every time slot. According to the geometric
distribution, the expected time that every link is probed is
1
p =
n
mt
≤ NMt ≤ NM . This completes the proof.
Nevertheless, for practical implementations, the accurate
number of m and n is still hard to obtain. It often comes
with errors in acquiring these two values. Hence, we need to
know the sensitivity of deviations of the two true values on
the regret performance. The result is summarized as follows.
Theorem 17. Given the deviation of observed values m is
m∆ in (7), the upper bound of the deviated of regret Rm∆(t)
with respect to the original R(t) given its upper bound R¯(t)
(a) in the adversarial regime is − 12m∆ nm R¯(t) and
− 13m∆ nm R¯(t) for oblivious jammer and for adaptive
adversary, respectively; (b) in the stochastic regime
and contaminated regime are both − 12 m∆m R¯(t); (c)
in the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime is
− 12 m∆m R¯k−ka(t)− 12m∆ nm R¯ka(t) for oblivious adversary and
is − 13 m∆m R¯k−ka(t) − 12m∆ nm R¯ka(t) for adaptive adversary,
where R¯k−ka(t) and R¯ka(t) represents the upper bounds with
k − ka and ka links in the stochastic regime and adversarial
regime, respectively.
Given the deviation of observed values n is n∆ in (7), the
upper bound of deviated of regret Rn∆(t) with respect to the
original R(t) given its upper bound R¯(t)
(d) in the adversarial regime is 12n∆ nm m−1n−1 R¯(t) ∼= 12n∆R¯(t)
and 13n∆
n
m
m−1
n−1 R¯(t)
∼= 13n∆R¯(t) for oblivious jammer and
for adaptive jammer, respectively; (e) in the stochastic regime
and contaminated regime are both R¯∆(t) = 0; (f) in the
mixed adversarial and stochastic regime is 12n∆R¯
ka(t) for
oblivious adversary and is 13n∆R¯
ka(t) for adaptive adversary.
From the theorem 17, we know that the regret in the
adversarial regime is more sensitive to the deviation m∆ than
the deviation n∆, which guides the design of the network
to acquire accurate value of mt during the probing phase.
For the stochastic regimes, we also see that the regret is
more sensitive to the deviation m∆ than the deviation n∆.
Moreover, the relative deviations on R(t) stochastic regimes,
i.e, Rm∆(t)/R(t) = Θ(m∆m ) and Rn∆(t)/R(t) = 0 is
much less (sensitive) than that in adversarial regimes, i.e.,
Rm∆(t)/R(t) = Θ(m∆
n
m ) and Rn∆(t)/R(t) = n∆. We see
all these phenomena in the simulations.
2) Delayed Feedback Issue: In the network with a large
number of links, the link delay feedback to the source node
will spend a lot of time, which is prohibitive in the realtime
process. Therefore, there are variant delayed feedbacks of each
link to the source. Moreover, if the path is switched in the
middle of a long streaming transmission, the network SPR
protocol needs a while to find the new optimal transmission
rate, and the delay of the first few packets after the switch
can be very large. In a nutshell, the delayed feedback issue is
practically important, and we have the following results.
Theorem 18. Given the largest expected deviations of
observed link delay τ∗, the expected delayed-feedback regret
Rd(t) with respect to the original R(t) (a) Assuming the
delays depend only on time but not on links, in the oblivious
adversarial regime is upper bounded by dtE[R( tdt )], where
dt = min{t, τ∗t +1} and τ∗t is the largest link delay at time t;
(b) Assuming the delays to be independent of the rewards of
the actions, in the stochastic regime and contaminated regime
is upper bounded by E[R(t)] +
∑n
e=1∆eE[τ
∗
e,t].
VI. THE COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AOPSR-EXP3++ ALGORITHM
The implementation of algorithm 1 requires the computation
of probability distributions and storage of N strategies, which
is obvious to have a time and space complexity O(nki) for a
given path of length ki. As the number of links increases, the
number of path will become exponentially large, which is very
hard to be scalable and results in low efficiency. To address
this important problem, we propose a computationally efficient
enhanced algorithm by utilizing the dynamic programming
techniques, as shown in Algorithm 3. The key idea of the
enhanced algorithm is to select links in the selected path one
by one until ki links are chosen, instead of choosing a path
from the large path space in each time slot.
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We use S
(
e¯, k¯
)
to denote the path set of which each path
selects k¯ links from e¯, e¯+ 1, e¯, ..., n. We also use S¯
(
e¯, k¯
)
to
denote the path set of which each path selects k¯ links from
link 1, 2, ..., e¯. We define Wt(e¯, k¯) =
∑
i∈S(e¯,k¯)
∏
e∈i wt(e)
and Wt(e¯, k¯) =
∑
i∈S¯(e¯,k¯)
∏
e∈i wt(e), Note that they have
the following properties:
Wt(e¯, k¯) = Wt(e¯+ 1, k¯) + wt(e¯)Wt(e¯+ 1, k¯ − 1), (10)
Wt(e¯, k¯) = Wt(e¯− 1, k¯) + wt(e¯)Wt(e¯− 1, k¯ − 1), (11)
which implies both Wt(e¯, k¯) and W¯t(e¯, k¯) can be calculated in
O(krn) (Letting Wt(e¯, 0) = 1 and W (n+1, k¯) = W¯ (0, k¯) =
0) by using dynamic programming for all 1 ≤ e¯ ≤ n and
1 ≤ k¯ ≤ ki.
In step 1, instead of drawing a path, we select links of the
path one by one until a path is found. Here, we select links
one by one in the increasing order of channel indices, i.e., we
determine whether the link 1 should be selected, and the link
2, and so on. For any link e, if k′ ≤ ki links have been chosen
in link 1, .., e− 1, we select link e with probability
wt−1(e)Wt(e + 1, ki − k′ − 1)
Wt−1(e, ki − k′) (12)
and not select e with probability Wt(e+1,ki−k
′−1)
Wt−1(e,ki−k′) . Let w(e) =
wt−1(e) if link e is selected in the path i; w(e) = 0 otherwise.
Obviously, w(e) is actually the weight of e in the path weight.
In our algorithm, wt−1(e) =
∏n
e=1 w(e). Let c(e) = 1 if e is
selected in i; c(e) = 0 otherwise. The term
∑e¯
e=1 c(e) denotes
the number of links chosen among link 1, 2, ..., e¯ in path i. In
this implementation, the probability that a path i is selected,
i.e., wt−1(i)Wt−1 , can be written as
n∏
e¯=1
w(e¯)Wt−1(e¯ + 1, ki −
∑e¯
e=1 c (e))
Wt−1(e¯, ki −
∑e¯−1
e=1 c (e))
=
n∏¯
e=1
w(e¯)
Wt−1(1, ki)
. (13)
This probability is equivalent to that in Algorithm 1, which
implies the implementation is correct. Because we do not
maintain wt(i), it is impossible to compute ρ˜t(e) as we have
described in Algorithm 1. Then ρ˜t(e) can be computed within
O(nkr) as in Eq.(4) for each round.
For the exploration parameters εt(e), since there are ki
parameters of εt(e) in the last term of Eqs. (14) below and
there are n links, the storage complexity is O(kn). Similarly,
we have the time complexity O(knt) for the maintenance of
exploration parameters εt(e). Based on the above analysis, we
can summarize the conclusions into the following theorem.
Moreover, under delayed feedback, since the base algorithm
has a memory requirement of O(kn), the memory required by
the delayed AUFH-EXP3++ by time step t is upper bounded
by O(knτ∗t ).
Theorem 19. The Algorithm 2 has polynomial time com-
plexity O(knt), space complexity O(kn) and space complex-
ity under the delayed feedback O(knτ∗t ) with respect to rounds
t, parameters k and n.
Besides, because of the link selection probability for qt(e)
and the updated weights of Algorithm 2 equals to Algorithm
1, all the performance results in Section III and IV still hold
for Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 3 A Computational Efficient Implementation of
AOPSR-EXP3++
Input: n, ki, t, and See text for definition of ηt and ξt(e).
Initialization: Set initial link weight w0(e) = 1, ∀e ∈ [1, n].
Let Wt(e, 0) = 1 and W (n + 1, k′) = W¯ (0, k′) = 0 and
compute W0(e, k′) and W¯0(e, k′) follows Eqs. (10) and
(11), respectively.
for time slot t = 1, 2, ... do
1: The source selects a link e, ∀e ∈ [1, n] one by one
according to the link’s probability distribution computed
following Eq. (12) until a path with ki chosen links are
selected.
2: The source computes the probability qt(e), ∀e ∈ [1, n]
according to Eq. (14).
3: The source calculates the loss for channel e,
ℓt−1(e), ∀e ∈ it based on the link loss ℓt−1(e). Compute
the estimated loss ℓ˜t(e), ∀e ∈ [1, n] as follows:
ℓ˜t(e) =
{
ℓt(e)
qt(e)
if channele ∈ it
0 otherwise.
4: The source updates all channel weights as wt (e) =
wt−1 (e) e−ηt ℓ˜t(e) = e−ηtL˜t(e), ∀e ∈ [1, n], and computes
Wt(e, k
′) and W¯t(e, k′) follows Eqs. (10) and (11),
respectively.
end for
VII. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of our online adaptive SPR
algorithm using a wireless sensor network (WSN) adopting the
IEEE 802.15 standard deployed on a university building. The
trace contains QoS metrics of detailed link quality information,
i.e., delay, goodput and packet loss rate, under an extensive set
of parameter configurations are measured. The dataset close
to 50 thousand parameter configurations were experimented
and measurement data of more than 200 million packets were
collected over a period of 6 months. Each sender-receiver is
employed by a pair of TelosB nodes, each equipped with a TI
CC2420 radio using the IEEE 802.15.4 stack implementation
in TinyOS, which is placed in hallways of a five floor building.
The WSN contains 16 nodes, and there is line-of-sight path
between the two nodes of a path at a specific distance, which
was varied for different experiments ranging from 10 meters to
35 meters. Each node is forwarding packets under a particular
stack parameter configuration, where the configuration set is
finite.
The delay perceived by a packet mainly consists of two
parts: queuing delay and service time delay, which are mea-
sured for every data packet. More specifically, it includes
the ACK frame transmission time, retransmission duration,
ACK maximal timeout if damage occurs by the adversarial
attack, etc. To quantitatively answer how all the layer stack
parameters contribute to the delay performance, there are four
different types of datasets to emulate the following four typical
regime of the environments: 1) the measured link quality
data at night, where the link states distributions are benign
and only affected by multi-path reflections from the walls; 2)
the measured contaminated link quality data at daytime from
9
(1−
∑n
e=1
εt(e))
∑ki−1
k′=0 W¯t−1(e− 1, k′)wt−1(e)Wt−1(e + 1, ki − k′ − 1)
Wt−1(1, k′)
+
∑
e∈i
εt(e) |i ∈ C : e ∈ i| (14)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 106
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 R
eg
re
t
t
 
 
SPR−EXP3[8]
AOSPR−EXP3++
AOSPR−EXP3++ m= 6
AOSPR−EXP3++ m= 16
OSPR[2]
OSPR[2] m=6
OSPR[2] m=16
Fig. 2: Regret in Stochastic Regime
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Fig. 4: Regret in Adversarial Regime
3 : 00pm−4 : 00pm, when university students and employees
walk most frequently in the hallway, which is a particularly
harsh wireless environment; 3) the measured adversarial link
quality, by the same type of TelosB nodes working under
the same stack parameter configuration but sending garbage
data to launch oblivious jamming attack during the run of the
algorithm. The link delay labeled N/A are replaced by 1111
or 999 in the dataset to indicate completed data packet loss; 4)
the measured adversarial link quality under adaptive jamming
attack, where the the algorithm is implemented by a set of θ-
memory jammers of our proposed AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm.
We omit the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime for
brevity.
All computations of collected datasets were conducted on an
off-the-shelf desktop with dual 6-core Intel i7 CPUs clocked
at 2.66Ghz. We make ten repetitions of each experiment to
reduce the potential performance bias. The solid lines in the
graphs represent the mean performance over the experiments
and the dashed lines represents the mean plus on standard
deviation (std) over the ten repetitions of the corresponding
experiments. To show the advantage of our AOPSR-EXP3++
algorithms, we need to compare the performance of ours
to other existing MAB based algorithms. They include: the
EXP3 based SPR algorithm in [8], which is named as “SPR-
EXP3”; the Upper-Confidence-Bound (UCB) based online
SPR algorithm “OSPR” in [2] and their variations. We set
all versions of our AOPSR-EXP3++ algorithms parameterized
by ξt(e) = ln(t∆ˆt(e)
2)
32t∆ˆt(e)
2 , where ∆ˆt(e) is the empirical estimate
of ∆t(e) defined in (5).
In our first group of experiments in the stochastic regime
(environment) as shown in Fig. 1, it is clear to see that AOPSR-
EXP3++ enjoys almost the same (cumulative) regrets as OSPR
[2] and has much lower regrets over time than the adversarial
SPR-EXP3 [8]. We also see the significantly regrets reduction
when accelerated learning (m = 6, 16) is employed for both
OSPR and AOPSR-EXP3++.
In our second group of experiments in the moderately
contaminated stochastic environment, there are several con-
taminated time slots as labeled in Fig. 3. In this case,
the contamination is not fully adversarial, but drawn from
a different stochastic model. Despite the corrupted rounds
the AOPSR-EXP3++ algorithm successfully returns to the
stochastic operation mode and achieves better results than
SPR-EXP3 [8]. With light contaminations, the performance
of OSPR in [2] is comparable to AOPSR-EXP3++, although
it is not applicable here due to the i.i.d. assumption of OSPR.
We conducted the third group of experiments in the ad-
versarial regimes. We studied the oblivious adversary case in
Fig. 4. Due to the strong interference effect on each link and
the arbitrarily changing feature of the jamming behavior, all
algorithms experience very high accumulated regrets. It can
be find that our AOPSR-EXP3++ algorithm will have close
and slightly worst learning performance when compared to
SPR-EXP3 [8], which confirms our theoretical analysis. Note
that we do not implement stochastic MAB algorithms such
as “OSPR” in [2], since it is inapplicable in this regime.
Moreover, we studied the adaptive adversary case in Fig. 5.
Compared with Fig. 4, the learning performance is much
worse, which results in close to linear (but still sublinear)
regret values, especially when the memory size of Θ is large.
From the collected data, we see a 252% increase in the
network delay under the adaptive adversary with Θ = 4 when
compared to the oblivious adversary conditions. The value
becomes 845% when Θ = 20, which shows the adaptive
attacker is very hard to defend.
The centralized and distributed implementation of our co-
operative learning AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithms are presented
in Fig. 6. The sensitivity of the deviation of observed values
m and n in stochastic and adversarial regimes are presented
in Fig. 8. It is obvious to see the effects of m∆ and n∆ on
the regret of AOSPR-EXP3++ in the stochastic regime is much
smaller compared to the counterpart in the adversarial regimes.
On average, we see a deviation of regret about 12% in the
stochastic regime for the values of m∆ and n∆ show in Fig.
8, while the deviation of regret is about 126% in the adversarial
regime. This indicated that our algorithm is more sensitive to
the attacked environments than benign environments.
We conduct the “Cold-Start” and delayed feedback version
of all algorithms in Fig. 7 in a general unknown environment
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that consists of data randomly mixed in all four regimes.
The “Cold-Start” phase takes about 3 ∼ 20 packets delivery
timslots. Although it is hard to see the first 20 rounds on
the plot, their effect on all the algorithms is clearly visible.
For delayed feedback problem, we see a “quick jump” of
regret for adversarial MAB algorithms (e.g., SPR-EXP3 [8])
at initial rounds that confirms its multiplicative effect to τ∗,
while the relative small regret increase is seen for stochastic
MAB algorithms (e.g., OSPR [2] and AOSPR-EXP3++) that
confirms its additive effect to τ∗.
We also compared the averaged received data packets delay
with different network sizes as shown in Fig. 9 for the mixed
stochastic and adversarial regime under different number of
links after a relative long period of learning rounds n = 7∗107.
We can find that with the increasing of the network size, the
learning performance of our AOSPR-EXP3++ is approaching
the state-of-the-art algorithms OSPR [2] and SPR-EXP3 [8]
in the stochastic and adversarial regimes, which indicates its
superior flexibility in large scale network deployments.
With the increasing of the network size, we find that the
learning performance of our AOSPR-EXP3++ is approaching
the state-of-the-art algorithms OSPR [2] and SPR-EXP3 [8]
in the stochastic and adversarial regimes, which indicates
its superior flexibility in large scale network deployments.
Comparing the values of average received data packets delays
of our AOSPR-EXP3++ to that of the classic algorithm SPR-
EXP3, we see a 65.3% improvements of the EE in average
under different set of links n = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 under oblivious
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Fig. 9: Delay Performance with Different Network Size
jamming attack, and a 124.8% improvements under adaptive
jamming attack. Moreover, to reach the same value of delay for
the AOSPR-EXP3++ algorithm, the SPR-EXP3 takes a total
of n = 12.8 ∗ 107 learning rounds. This indicates a 81.5%
improvement in the learning period of our proposed AOSPR-
EXP3++ algorithm.
Moreover, we test the performance of the computational
efficiency of our algorithms, where the computational time
is compared in Table 1. From the results, we know that
the computationally efficient version of the AOPSR-EXP3++
algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 3, takes about several hundreds of
micro-seconds on average, while the original algorithm takes
about several hundreds of seconds, which is prohibitive in
practical implementations.
VIII. PROOFS OF REGRETS IN DIFFERENT REGIMES FOR
THE SIGNAL-SOURCE AOSPR
We prove the theorems of the performance results in Section
III in the order they were presented.
A. The Adversarial Regimes
The proof of Theorem 1 borrows some of the analysis of
EXP3 of the loss model in [10]. However, the introduction of
the new mixing exploration parameter and the truth of link
dependency as a special type of combinatorial MAB problem
in the loss model makes the proof a non-trivial task, and we
prove it for the first time.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: Note first that the following equalities can
be easily verified: Ei∼ρt ℓ˜t(i) = ℓt(It),Eℓ˜t∼ρtℓt(i) =
ℓt(i),Ei∼ρt ℓ˜t(i)2 =
ℓt(It)2
ρt(It) and EIt∼ρt
1
ρt(It) = N .
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TABLE I: Computation Time Comparisons of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3
(n, k)
Alg. Ver. vs Comp. Time (micro seconds) (12, 4) (24, 4) (48, 6) (48, 12) (64, 6) (64, 12) (64, 24)
AOPSR-EXP3++:Algorithm1 46.1610 267.3351 819.7124 2622.1341 11087.0957 222376.0135 1868341.2324
AOPSR-EXP3++ Algorithm3 14.5137 29.1341 61.6366 157.6732 258.3622 456.1143 790.5101
Then, we can immediately rewrite R(t) and have
R(t) = Et
[
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ps ℓ˜s(i)−
t∑
s=1
EIs∼ps ℓ˜s(i)
]
.
The key step here is to consider the expectation of the
cumulative losses ℓ˜t(i) in the sense of distribution i ∼ ρt.
Let εt(i) =
∑
e∈i εt(e). However, because of the mixing
terms of ρt, we need to introduce a few more notations. Let
u = (
∑
e∈1
εt(e), ...,
∑
e∈i
εt(e), ...,
∑
e∈|C|
εt(e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i∈C
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i/∈C
)
be the distribution over all the strategies. Let ωt−1 =
ρt−u
1−∑
e
εt(e)
be the distribution induced by AOSPR-EXP3++
at the time t without mixing. Then we have:
Ei∼ps ℓ˜s(i) = (1−
∑
e εs(e))Ei∼ωs−1 ℓ˜s(i) + εs(i)Ei∼uℓ˜s(i)
= (1−∑e εs(e))( 1ηs lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηs(ℓ˜s(i)
−Ej∼ωs−1 ℓ˜t(j))))
− (1−
∑
e
εs(e))
ηs
lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηsℓ˜s(i)))
+Ei∼uℓ˜t(i).
(14)
Recall that for all the strategies, we have distribution ωt−1 =
(ωt−1(1), ..., ωt−1(N)) with
ωt−1(i) =
exp(−ηtL˜t−1(i))∑N
j=1 exp(−ηtL˜t−1(j))
, (15)
and for all the links, we have distribution ωt−1,e =
(ωt−1,e(1), ..., ωt−1,e(n))
ωt−1,e(e′) =
∑
i:e′∈i exp(−ηtL˜t−1(i))∑N
j=1 exp(−ηtL˜t−1(j))
. (16)
In the second step, we use the inequalities lnx ≤ x− 1 and
exp(−x)− 1+x ≤ x2/2, for all x ≥ 0, and the fact that take
expectations over j ∼ ωs−1 and over i ∼ ωs−1 are equivalent,
to obtain:
lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηs(ℓ˜s(i)− Ej∼ωs−1 ℓ˜s(j)))
= lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηsℓ˜s(i)) + ηsEi∼ωs−1 ℓ˜s(i)
≤ Ei∼ωs−1(exp(−ηsℓ˜s(i))− 1 + ηsℓ˜s(i))
≤ Ei∼ωs−1 η
2
s ℓ˜s(i)
2
2 .
(17)
Take expectations over all random strategies of losses ℓ˜s(i)2,
we have
Et
[
Ei∼ws ℓ˜s(i)2
]
= Et
[
N∑
i=1
ωs−1(i)ℓ˜s(i)2
]
= Et
[
N∑
i=1
ωs−1(i)(
∑
e∈i
ℓ˜s(e))
2
]
≤ Et
[
N∑
i=1
ωs−1(i)k
∑
e∈i
ℓ˜s(e)
2
]
=Etk
[
n∑
e=1
ℓ˜s(e)
2 ∑
i∈P:e∈i
ωs−1(i)
]
=kEt
[
n∑
e′=1
ℓ˜s(e
′)2ωs−1,e(e′)
]
= kEs
[
n∑
e′=1
(
lt(e
′)
ρ˜s(e′)
1s(e
′)
)2
ωs−1,e(e′)
]
≤ kEs
[
n∑
e′=1
ωs−1,e(e
′)
ρ˜s(e′)
2 1s(e
′)
]
= k
n∑
e′=1
ωs−1,e(e
′)
ρ˜s(e′)
= k
n∑
e′=1
ωs−1,e(e
′)
(1−
∑
e
εs(e))ωs−1,e(e′)+
∑
e∈i εs(e)|{i∈C:e∈i}|
≤ 2kn,
(18)
where the last inequality follows the fact that
(1−∑e εt(e)) ≥ 12 by the definition of εt(e).
In the third step, note that L˜0(i) = 0. Let Φt(η) =
1
η ln
1
N
∑N
i=1 exp(−ηL˜t(i)) and Φ0(η) = 0. The second term
in (14) can be bounded by using the same technique in [10]
(page 26-28). Let us substitute inequality (18) into (17), and
then substitute (17) into equation (14) and sum over t and take
expectation over all random strategies of losses up to time t,
we obtain
Et
[
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ps ℓ˜s(i)
]
≤ kn
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
+
t∑
s=1
Ei∼uℓ˜s(i)
+Et
[
t−1∑
s=1
Φs(ηs+1)− Φs(ηs)
]
+
t∑
s=1
EIs∼ps ℓ˜s(i).
Then, we get
R(t) = Et
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ps ℓ˜s(i)− Et
t∑
s=1
EIs∼ps ℓ˜s(i)
≤ kn
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
+
t∑
s=1
Ei∼uℓ˜s(i)
(a)
≤ kn
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
+ k
t∑
s=1
n∑
e=1
εs(e)
(b)
≤ 2kn
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
(c)
≤ 2kn
t∑
s=1
ηs + k
lnn
ηt
.
Note that, the inequality (a) holds by setting ℓ˜s(i) =
k, ∀i, s, and the upper bound is k∑i∈C∑e∈i εt(e) =
k
∑t
s=1
∑n
e=1 εs(e). The inequality (b) holds, because of, for
every time slot t, ηt ≥ εt(e). The inequality (c) is due to the
fact that N ≤ nk. Setting ηt = βt, we prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof: To defend against the θ-memory-bounded adaptive
adversary, we need to adopt the idea of the mini-batch protocol
proposed in [9]. We define a new algorithm by wrapping
AOSPR-EXP3++ with a mini-batching loop [26]. We specify
a batch size τ and name the new algorithm AOSPR-EXP3++τ .
The idea is to group the overall time slots 1, ..., t into consec-
utive and disjoint mini-batches of size τ . It can be viewed
that one signal mini-batch as a round (time slot) and use
the average loss suffered during that mini-batch to feed the
original AOSPR-EXP3++. Note that our new algorithm does
not need to know m, which only appears as a constant as
shown in Theorem 2. So our new AOSPR-EXP3++τ algorithm
still runs in an adaptive way without any prior about the
environment. If we set the batch τ = (4k
√
n lnn)−
1
3 t
1
3 in
Theorem 2 of [9], we can get the regret upper bound in our
Theorem 2.
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B. The Stochastic Regime
Our proofs are based on the following form of Bernstein’s
inequality with minor improvement as shown in [15].
Lemma 1. (Bernstein’s inequality for martingales). Let
X1, ..., Xm be martingale difference sequence with respect
to filtration F = (Fi)1≤k≤m and let Yk =
∑k
j=1Xj be
the associated martingale. Assume that there exist positive
numbers ν and c, such that Xj ≤ c for all j with probability
1 and
∑m
k=1 E
[
(Xk)
2|Fk−1
]
≤ ν with probability 1.
P[Ym >
√
2νb+
cb
3
] ≤ e−b.
We also need to use the following technical lemma, where
the proof can be found in [15].
Lemma 2. For any c > 0, we have
∑∞
t=0 e
−c√t = O
(
2
c2
)
.
To obtain the tight regret performance for AOSPR-EXP3++,
we need to study and estimate the number of times each of
link is selected up to time t, i.e., Nt(e). We summarize it in
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let {εt(e)}∞t=1 be non-increasing deterministic
sequences, such that εt(e) ≤ εt(e) with probability 1 and
εt(e) ≤ εt(e∗) for all t and e. Define νt(e) =
∑t
s=1
1
kε
s
(e) ,
and define the event Eet
t∆(e)− (L˜t(e)− L˜t(e∗))
≤
√
2(νt(e) + νt(e∗))bt +
(1/k + 0.25)bt
3kεt(e
∗)
(Eet ).
Then for any positive sequence b1, b2, ..., and any t∗ ≥ 2 the
number of times link e is played by AOSPR-EXP3++ up to
round t is bounded as:
E[Nt(e)] ≤ (t∗ − 1) +
t∑
s=t∗
e−bs + k
t∑
s=t∗
εs(e)1{Eet }
+
t∑
s=t∗
e−ηshs−1(e),
(19)
where
ht(e) = t∆(e)−
√
2tbt
(
1
kεt(e)
+ 1kεt(e∗)
)
− ( 14+ 1k )bt3εt(e∗) .
Proof: Note that the elements of the martingale differ-
ence sequence {∆(e)− (ℓ˜t(e)− ℓ˜t(e∗))}∞t=1 by max{∆(e)+
ℓ˜t(e
∗)} = 1kεt(e∗)+1. Since εt(e
∗) ≤ εt(e∗) ≤ 1/(2n) ≤ 1/4,
we can simplify the upper bound by using 1kεt(e∗) + 1 ≤
( 14+
1
k
)
ε
t
(e∗) .
We further note that
t∑
s=1
Es
[
(∆(e)− (ℓ˜s(e)− ℓ˜s(e∗)))2
]
≤
t∑
s=1
Es
[
(ℓ˜s(e)− ℓ˜s(e∗))2
]
=
t∑
s=1
(
Es
[
(ℓ˜s(e)
2
]
+ Es
[
(ℓ˜s(e
∗)2
])
≤
t∑
s=1
(
1
qs(e)
+ 1qs(e∗)
)
(a)
≤
t∑
s=1
(
1
kεs(e)
+ 1kεs(e∗)
)
≤
t∑
s=1
(
1
kε
s
(e) +
1
kε
s
(e∗)
)
= νt(e) + νt(e
∗)
with probability 1. The above inequality (a) is due to the
fact that ρ˜t(e) ≥
∑
e∈i εt(e) |{i ∈ C : e ∈ i}|. Since each
e only belongs to one of the covering strategies i ∈ C,
|{i ∈ C : e ∈ i}| equals to 1 at time slot t if link e is selected.
Thus, ρ˜t(e) ≥
∑
e∈i εt(e) = kεt(e).
Let E¯et denote the complementary of event Eet . Then by the
Bernstein’s inequality P[E¯et ] ≤ e−bt . The number of times the
link e is selected up to round t is bounded as:
E[Nt(e)] =
t∑
s=1
P[As = e]
=
t∑
s=1
P[As = e|Ees−1]P [Ees−1]
+P[As = e|Ees−1]P [Ees−1]
≤
t∑
s=1
P[As = e|Ees−1]1{Ees−1} + P[ESs−1]
≤
t∑
s=1
P[As = e|Ees−1]1{Ees−1} + e−bs−1 .
We further upper bound P[As = e|Ees−1]1{Ees−1} as follows:
P[As = e|Ees−1]1{Ees−1} = ρ˜s(e)1{Ees−1}
≤ (ωs−1(e) + kεs(e))1{Ee
s−1}
= (kεs(e) +
∑
i:e∈i ws−1(i)
Ws−1
)1{Ee
s−1}
= (kεs(e) +
∑
i:e∈i e
−ηsL˜s−1(i)
∑
N
i=1 e
−ηsL˜s−1(i)
)1{Ee
s−1}
(a)
≤ (kεs(e) + e−ηs(L˜s−1(i)−L˜s−1(i
∗)))1{Ee
s−1}
(b)
≤(kεs(e) + e−ηt(L˜s−1(e)−L˜s−1(e
∗)))1{Ee
s−1}
(c)
≤ kεs(e)1{Ee
s−1} + e
−ηshs−1(e).
The above inequality (a) is due to the fact that link e only
belongs to one chosen path i in t−1, inequality (b) is because
the cumulative regret of each path is great than the cumulative
regret of each link that belongs to the path, and the last
inequality (c) we used the fact that tεt(e) is a non-increasing
sequence υt(e) ≤ tkεt(e) . Substitution of this result back into
the computation of E[Nt(e)] completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof: The proof is based on Lemma 3. Let bt =
ln(t∆(e)2) and εt(e) = εt(e). For any c ≥ 18 and any
t ≥ t∗, where t∗ is the minimal integer for which t∗ ≥
4c2n ln (t∗∆(e)2)
2
∆(e)4 ln(n)
, we have
ht(e) = t∆(e)−
√
2tbt
(
1
kεt(e)
+ 1kεt(e∗)
)
− (
1
4+
1
k )bt
3εt(e∗)
≥ t∆(e)− 2
√
tbt
kεt(e)
− (
1
4+
1
k )bt
3εt(e)
= t∆(e)(1− 2√
kc
− (
1
4+
1
k )
3c )
(a)
≥ t∆(e)(1− 2√
c
− 1.253c ) ≥ 12 t∆(e).
The above inequality (a) is due to the fact that (1 − 2√
kc
−
( 14+
1
k )
3c ) is an increasing function with respect to k(k ≥ 1).
Plus, as indicated in work [16], by a bit more sophisticated
bounding c can be made almost as small as 2 in our case. By
substitution of the lower bound on ht(e) into Lemma 3, we
have
E[Nt(e)] ≤ t∗ + ln(t)∆(e)2 + k
c ln (t)2
∆(e)2
+
t∑
s=1
(
e−
∆(e)
4
√
(s−1)ln(n)
n
)
≤ k c ln (t)2
∆(e)2
+ ln(t)
∆(e)2
+O( n
∆(e)2
) + t∗,
where lemma 3 is used to bound the sum of the exponents. In
addition, please note that t∗ is of the order O( kn
∆(e)4 ln(n)
).
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Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof: The proof is based on the similar idea of Theorem
2 and Lemma 3. Note that by our definition ∆ˆt(e) ≤ 1 and
the sequence εt(e) = εt = min{ 12n , βt, c ln (t)
2
t } satisfies the
condition of Lemma 3. Note that when βt ≥ c ln (t)
2
t }, i.e., for
t large enough such that t ≥ 4c2 ln (t)4nln(n) , we have εt = c ln (t)
2
t .
Let bt = ln(t) and let t∗ be large enough, so that for all t ≥ t∗
we have t ≥ 4c2 ln (t)4nln(n) and t ≥ e
1
∆(e)2
. With these parameters
and conditions on hand, we are going to bound the rest of
the three terms in the bound on E[Nt(e)] in Lemma 3. The
upper bound of
∑t
s=t∗ e
−bs is easy to obtain. For bounding
k
∑t
s=t∗ εs(e)1{Ees−1}, we note that Eet holds and for c ≥ 18
we have
∆ˆt(e) ≥ 1t (L˜t(e)−maxe′ (L˜t(e
′))) ≥ 1t (L˜t(e)− L˜t(e∗))
≥ 1tht(e) = 1t
(
t∆(e)− 2
√
tbt
kεt
− ( 14+ 1k )bt3εt
)
= 1t
(
t∆(e)− 2t√
ck ln(t)
− ( 14+ 1k )t3c ln(t)
)
(a)
≥ 1t
(
t∆(e)− 2t√
c ln(t)
− 1.25t3c ln(t)
)
(b)
≥ ∆(e)
(
1− 2√
c
− 1.253c
)
≥ 12∆(e),
where the inequality (a) is due to the fact that 1t (t∆(e) −
2t√
ck ln(t)
− ( 14+ 1k )t3c ln(t) ) is an increasing function with respect to
k(k ≥ 1) and the inequality (b) due to the fact that for t ≥ t∗
we have
√
ln(t) ≥ 1/∆(e). Thus,
εn(e)1{Ee
n−1} ≤
c(ln t)
2
t∆ˆt(e)
2 ≤
4c2(ln t)
2
t∆(e)2
and k
∑t
s=t∗ εs(e)1{Een−1} = O
(
k ln (t)3
∆(e)2
)
. Finally, for the
last term in Lemma 3, we have already get ht(e) ≥ 12∆(e)
for t ≥ t∗ as an intermediate step in the calculation of bound
on ∆ˆt(e). Therefore, the last term is bounded in a order of
O( n
∆(e)2
). Use all these results together we obtain the results
of the theorem. Note that the results holds for any ηt ≥ βt.
C. Mixed Adversarial and Stochastic Regime
Proof of Theorem 5.
Proof: The proof of the regret performance in the mixed
adversarial and stochastic regime is simply a combination
of the performance of the AOSPR-EXP3++AVG algorithm in
adversarial and stochastic regimes. It is very straightforward
from Theorem 1 and Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 6.
Proof: Similar as above, the proof is very straightforward
from Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
D. Contaminated Stochastic Regime
Proof of Theorem 7.
Proof: The key idea of proving the regret bound under
moderately contaminated stochastic regime relies on how to
estimate the performance loss by taking into account the
contaminated pairs. Let 1⋆t,e denote the indicator functions of
the occurrence of contamination at location (t, e), i.e., 1⋆t,e
takes value 1 if contamination occurs and 0 otherwise. Let
mt(e) = 1
⋆
t,eℓ˜t(e) + (1− 1⋆t,e)µ(e). If either base arm e was
contaminated on round t then mt(e) is adversarially assigned
a value of loss that is arbitrarily affected by some adversary,
otherwise we use the expected loss. Let Zt(e) =
∑t
s=1mt(e)
then (Zt(e)− Zt(e∗)) −
(
L˜t(e)− L˜t(e∗)
)
is a martingale.
After τ steps, for t ≥ τ ,
(Zt(e)− Zt(e∗)) ≥ tmin{1⋆t,e,1⋆t,e∗}(ℓ˜t(e)− ℓ˜t(e∗))
+tmin{1− 1⋆t,e, 1− 1⋆t,e∗}(µ(e)− µ(e∗))
≥ −ζt∆(e) + (t− ζt∆(e))∆(e) ≥ (1− 2ζ)t∆(e).
Define the event Zet :
(1− 2ζ)t∆(e)−
(
L˜t(e)− L˜t(e∗)
)
≤ 2
√
νtbt +
(
1
4 +
1
k
)
bt
3εt
,
where εt is defined in the proof of Theorem 3 and νt =∑t
s=1
1
kεt
. Then by Bernstein’s inequality P[Zet ] ≤ e−bt . The
remanning proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 3.
For the regret performance in the moderately contaminated
stochastic regime, according to our definition with the attack-
ing strength ζ ∈ [0, 1/4], we only need to replace ∆(e) by
∆(e)/2 in Theorem 5.
IX. PROOF OF REGRET FOR ACCELERATED AOSPR
ALGORITHM
We prove the theorems of the performance results in Section
IV in the order they were presented.
A. Accelerated Learning in Adversarial Regime
The proof the Theorem 8 requires the following Lemma
from Lemma 7 [19]. We restate it for completeness.
Lemma 4. For any probability distribution ω˜ on {1, ..., n}
and any m ∈ [1, n]:
n∑
e=1
ω˜(e)(n− 1)
ω˜(e)(n−m) +m− 1 ≤
n
m
.
Proof of Theorem 8.
Proof: Note first that the following equalities can
be easily verified: Ei∼̺t ℓ˜t(i) = ℓt(It),Eℓ˜t∼̺tℓt(i) =
ℓt(i),Ei∼̺t ℓ˜t(i)2 =
ℓt(It)2
̺t(It) and EIt∼̺t
1
̺t(It) = N .
Then, we can immediately rewrite R(t) and have
R(t) = Et
[
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ρs ℓ˜s(i)−
t∑
s=1
EIs∼ρs ℓ˜s(i)
]
.
The key step here is to consider the expectation of the
cumulative losses ℓ˜t(i) in the sense of distribution i ∼ ̺t. Let
εt(i) =
∑
e∈i εt(e). However, because of the mixing terms
of ̺t, we need to introduce a few more notations. Let ϕs =
(
∑
e∈1
εt(e), ...,
∑
e∈i
εt(e), ...,
∑
e∈|C|
εt(e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i∈C
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i/∈C
) be
the distribution over all the strategies. Let ωt−1 = ρt−u1−∑
e
εt(e)
be the distribution induced by AOSPR-EXP3++ at the time t
without mixing. Then we have:
Ei∼ρs ℓ˜s(i) = (1−
∑
e εs(e))Ei∼ωs−1 ℓ˜s(i) + εs(i)Ei∼uℓ˜s(i)
= (1 −∑e εs(e))( 1ηs lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηs(ℓ˜s(i)
−Ej∼ωs−1 ℓ˜t(j))))
− (1−
∑
e εs(e))
ηs
lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηsℓ˜s(i)))
+εs(i)Ei∼uℓ˜s(i).
(20)
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In the second step, by similar arguments as in the proof of
Theorem 1, we have:
lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηs(ℓ˜s(i)− Ej∼ωs−1 ℓ˜s(j)))
= lnEi∼ωs−1 exp(−ηsℓ˜s(i)) + ηsEj∼ωs−1 ℓ˜s(j)
≤ Ei∼ωs−1(exp(−ηsℓ˜s(i))− 1 + ηsℓ˜s(i))
≤ Ei∼ωs−1 η
2
s ℓ˜s(i)
2
2 .
(21)
Take expectations over all random strategies of losses ℓ˜s(i)2,
we have
Et
[
Ei∼ωs−1 ℓ˜s(i)2
]
= Et
[
N∑
i=1
ωs−1(i)ℓ˜s(i)2
]
= Et
[
N∑
i=1
ωs−1(i)(
∑
e∈i
ℓ˜s(e))
2
]
≤ Et
[
N∑
i=1
ωs−1(i)k
∑
e∈i
ℓ˜s(e)
2
]
=Etk
[
n∑
e=1
ℓ˜s(e)
2 ∑
i∈P:e∈i
ωs−1(i)
]
=kEt
[
n∑
e′=1
ℓ˜s(e
′)2ωs−1,e(e′)
]
= kEt
[
n∑
e=1
(
ls(e)
˜̺s(e)
1s(e)
)2
ω˜s−1(e)
]
≤ kEt
[
n∑
e=1
ω˜s−1(e)
˜̺s(e)
2 1s(e)
]
= k
n∑
e=1
ω˜s−1(e)
˜̺s(e)
= k
n∑
e=1
ω˜s−1(e)
ρ˜s(e)+(1−ρ˜s(e))ms−1n−1
(a)
≤ k
n∑
e=1
2ρ˜s(e)
ρ˜t(e)+(1−ρ˜s(e))ms−1n−1
(b)
≤ 2k nm ,
(22)
where the above inequality (a) follows the fact that
(1−∑e εt(e)) ≥ 12 by the definition of εt(e) and the equality
(4) and the above inequality (b) follows the Lemma 4. Note
that ϕs−1(e) =
∑
e∈i εt(e) |{i ∈ C : e ∈ i}| , ∀e ∈ [1, n] Take
expectations over all random strategies of losses ℓ˜s(i) with
respective to distribution u, we have
Et
[
Ei∼ϕs ℓ˜s(i)
]
= Et
[
N∑
i=1
ϕs(i)ℓ˜s(i)
]
= Et
[
N∑
i=1
ϕs(i)(
∑
e∈i
ℓ˜s(e))
]
≤ Et
[
N∑
i=1
ϕs(i)(
∑
e∈i
ℓ˜s(e))
]
=Et
[
n∑
e=1
ℓ˜s(e)
∑
i∈P:e∈i
ϕs(i)
]
=Et
[
n∑
e′=1
ℓ˜s(e
′)ϕs(e′)
]
≤ kEt
[
n∑
e′=1
ϕs(e
′)
ρ˜s(e′)
1s(e
′)
]
= k
n∑
e′=1
ϕs(e
′)
ρ˜s(e′)
= k
n∑
e′=1
ϕs(e
′)
ρ˜s(e)+(1−ρ˜s(e))ms−1n−1
(a)
≤ k
n∑
e′=1
ρ˜s(e)
ρ˜s(e)+(1−ρ˜s(e))ms−1n−1
≤ 2k nm ,
(23)
where the above inequality (a) is because ρ˜t(e) ≥ ϕs−1(e).
In the third step, note that L˜0(i) = 0. Let Φt(η) =
1
η ln
1
N
∑N
i=1 exp(−ηL˜t(i)) and Φ0(η) = 0. The second term
in (20) can be bounded by using the same technique in [10]
(page 26-28). Let us substitute inequality (22) into (21), and
then substitute (21) into equation (20) and sum over t and take
expectation over all random strategies of losses up to time t,
we obtain
Et
[
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ρs ℓ˜s(i)
]
≤ kn
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
+
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ϕs ℓ˜s(i)
+Et
[
t−1∑
s=1
Φs(ηs+1)− Φs(ηs)
]
+ Et
t∑
s=1
ℓ˜s(i).
Then, we get
R(t) = Et
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ps ℓ˜s(i)− Et
t∑
s=1
EIs∼ϕs ℓ˜s(i)
≤ k n
m
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
+
t∑
s=1
Ei∼ϕs ℓ˜s(i)
(a)
≤ k n
m
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
+ k
n
m
t∑
s=1
n∑
e=1
εs(e)
(b)
≤ 2k n
m
t∑
s=1
ηs +
lnN
ηt
(c)
≤ 2k n
m
t∑
s=1
ηs + k
lnn
ηt
. (24)
Note that, the inequality (a) holds according to (23). The
inequality (b) holds is because of, for every time slot t,
ηt ≥ εt(e). The inequality (c) is due to the fact that N ≤ nk.
Setting ηt = bt, we prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 9.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 9 for adaptive adversary is
based on Theorem 8, and use the same idea as in the proof of
Theorem 2. Here, If we set the batch τ = (4k
√
n
m lnn)
− 13 t
1
3
in Theorem 2 of [9], we can get the regret upper bound in our
Theorem 9.
B. Accelerated AOSPR Algorithm in The Stochastic Regime
To obtain the tight regret performance for AOSPR-MP-
EXP3++, we need to study and estimate the number of times
each of link is selected up to time t, i.e., Nt(e). We summarize
it in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. In the multipath probing case, let {εt(e)}∞t=1
be non-increasing deterministic sequences, such that εt(e) ≤
εt(e) with probability 1 and εt(e) ≤ εt(e∗) for all t and e.
Define νt(e) =
∑t
s=1
1
kεs(e)
, and define the event Ξet
mt∆(e)− (L˜t(e∗)− L˜t(e))
≤
√
2(νt(e) + νt(e∗))bt +
(1/k + 0.25)bt
3kεt(e
∗)
(Ξet ).
Then for any positive sequence b1, b2, ..., and any t∗ ≥ 2 the
number of times link e is played by AOSPR-EXP3++ up to
round t is bounded as:
E[Nt(e)] ≤ (t∗ − 1) +
t∑
s=t∗
e−bs + k
t∑
s=t∗
εs(e)1{Ξet}
+
t∑
s=t∗
e−ηsℏs−1(e),
where
ℏt(e) = mt∆(e)−
√
2mtbt
(
1
kεt(e)
+ 1kεt(e∗)
)
− ( 14+ 1k )bt3εt(e∗) .
Proof: Note that AOSPR-MP-EXP3++ probes Mt paths
rather than 1 path each time slot t. Let # {·} stands for the
number of elements in the set {·}. Hence,
E[Nt(e)] = E[# {1 ≤ s ≤ t : As = e, Eet }+
#
{
1 ≤ s ≤ t : As = e, Eet
}
],
where As denotes the action of link selection at time slot s.
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By the following simple trick, we have
E[Nt(e)] = E[# {1 ≤ s ≤ t : As = e, Eet }]+
E[#
{
1 ≤ s ≤ t : As = e, Eet
}
]]
≤ E[
t∑
s=1
1{1≤s≤t:As=e}P[#{Eet }]]+
E[
t∑
s=1
1{1≤s≤t:As=e}P[#{Eet }]]
(25)
≤ E[
t∑
s=1
1{1≤s≤t:As=e}P[Ξ
e
mt]]+
E[
t∑
s=1
1{1≤s≤t:As=e}P[Ξ
e
mt]].
(26)
Note that the elements of the martingale difference se-
quence in the {∆(e)− (ℓ˜t(e)− ℓ˜t(e∗))}∞t=1 by max{∆(e) +
ℓ˜t(e
∗)} = 1kε
t
(e∗)+1. Since εt(e
∗) ≤ εt(e∗) ≤ 1/(2n) ≤ 1/4,
we can simplify the upper bound by using 1kε
t
(e∗) + 1 ≤
( 14+
1
k
)
εt(e
∗) .
We further note that
Es
{
#
{
t∑
s=1
[
(∆(e)− (ℓ˜s(e)− ℓ˜s(e∗)))2
]}}
(a)
≤ Es
{
m
t∑
s=1
[
(∆(e)− (ℓ˜s(e)− ℓ˜s(e∗)))2
]}
≤ m
t∑
s=1
Es
[
(ℓ˜s(e)− ℓ˜s(e∗))2
]
= m
t∑
s=1
(
Es
[
(ℓ˜s(e)
2
]
+ Es
[
(ℓ˜s(e
∗)2
])
≤ m
t∑
s=1
(
1
˜̺s(e)
+ 1˜̺s(e∗)
)
(b)
≤ m
t∑
s=1
(
1
kεs(e)
+ 1kεs(e∗)
)
≤ m
t∑
s=1
(
1
kεs(e)
+ 1kεs(e∗)
)
= mνt(e) +mνt(e
∗)
with probability 1. The above inequality (a) is because the
number of probes for each link e at time slot s is at most
m times, so does the accumulated value of the variance
(∆(e)− (ℓ˜s(e)− ℓ˜s(e∗)))2. The above inequality (b) is due
to the fact that ˜̺t(e) ≥ ρ˜t(e) ≥
∑
e∈i εt(e) |{i ∈ C : e ∈ i}|.
Since each e only belongs to one of the covering strategies
i ∈ C, |{i ∈ C : e ∈ i}| equals to 1 at time slot t if link e is
selected. Thus, ρ˜t(e) ≥
∑
e∈i εt(e) = kεt(e).
Let E¯et denote the complementary of event Eet . Then by
the Bernstein’s inequality P[E¯et ] ≤ e−bt . According to (26),
the number of times the link e is selected up to round t is
bounded as:
E[Nt(e)] ≤
t∑
s=1
P[As = e|Ξes−1]P [Ξes−1]
+P[As = e|Ξes−1]P [Ξes−1]
≤
t∑
s=1
P[As = e|Ξes−1]1{Ξes−1} + P[ΞSs−1]
≤
t∑
s=1
P[As = e|Ξes−1]1{Ξes−1} + e−bs−1 .
We further upper bound P[As = e|Ξes−1]1{Ξes−1} as follows:
P[As = e|Ξes−1]1{Ξes−1} = ρ˜s(e)1{Ξes−1}
≤ (ωs−1(e) + kεs(e))1{Ξe
s−1}
= (kεs(e) +
∑
i:e∈i ws−1(i)
Ws−1
)1{Ξe
s−1}
= (kεs(e) +
∑
i:e∈i e
−ηsL˜s−1(i)
∑
N
i=1 e
−ηsL˜s−1(i)
)1{Ξe
s−1}
(a)
≤ (kεs(e) + e−ηs(L˜s−1(i)−L˜s−1(i
∗)))1{Ξe
s−1}
(b)
≤(kεs(e) + e−ηs(L˜s−1(e)−L˜s−1(e
∗)))1{Ξe
s−1}
(c)
≤ kεs(e)1{Ξe
s−1} + e
−ηsℏs−1(e).
The above inequality (a) is due to the fact that link e only
belongs to one chosen path i in t−1, inequality (b) is because
the cumulative regret of each path is great than the cumulative
regret of each link that belongs to the path, and the last
inequality (c) we used the fact that tεt(e) is a non-increasing
sequence υt(e) ≤ tkεt(e) . Substitution of this result back into
the computation of E[Nt(e)] completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 10.
Proof: The proof is based on Lemma 3. Let bt =
ln(t∆(e)2) and εt(e) = εt(e). For any c ≥ 18 and any
t ≥ t∗, where t∗ is the minimal integer for which t∗ ≥
4c2n ln (t∗∆(e)2)
2
m2∆(e)4 ln(n)
, we have
ℏt(e) = mt∆(e)−
√
2mtbt
(
1
kεt(e)
+ 1kεt(e∗)
)
− (
1
4+
1
k )bt
3εt(e∗)
≥ mt∆(e)− 2
√
mtbt
kεt(e)
− (
1
4+
1
k )bt
3εt(e)
= mt∆(e)(1 − 2√
kc
− (
1
4+
1
k )
3c )
(a)
≥ mt∆(e)(1− 2√
c
− 1.253c ) ≥ 12mt∆(e),
where εt(e) = c ln(t∆(e)
2)
tm∆(e)2
. By substitution of the lower bound
on ht(e) into Lemma 3, we have
E[Nt(e)] ≤ t∗+ ln(t)∆(e)2 +k
c ln (t)2
m∆(e)2
+
t∑
s=1
(e−
m∆(e)
4
√
(s−1)ln(n)
n )
≤ k c ln (t)2
m∆(e)2
+ ln(t)
∆(e)2
+O( n
m2∆(e)2
) + t∗,
(27)
where lemma 3 is used to bound the sum of the exponents. In
addition, please note that t∗ is of the order O( kn
m2∆(e)4 ln(n)
).
Proof of Theorem 11-Theorem 13. The proofs of Theorem
11-Theorem 13 use similar idea as in the proof of Theorem
14. We omitted here for brevity.
Proof of Theorem 14.
Proof: For the AOSPR-CP-EXP3++ algorithm, multiple
source-destination pairs are coordinated to avoid probing the
overlapping path as little as possible, where now the statisti-
cally collected link-level probing rate m′t is no less than the
mt at each time slot. Thus, the actual link probability ˜̺t(e)
is no less than the one in (7). Following the same line of
analysis, the regret upper bounds in Theorem 8-13 hold for
the AOSPR-CP-EXP3++ algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 15.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 15 also relies on the
Theorem 8-13. Moreover, it requires the construction of a
linear program. Let Ces(e = 1, ..., n, s = 1, ..., S) be the
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indicator that link i is covered by the paths of the source-
destination pair s, Es
∆
= {e ∈ E : Ces = 1} be the subset of
links constructing path s and ks
∆
=
∑n
e=1 Ces the size of this
subset. Consider a source-destination pair s. The key point
is to bound the minimum link sample size mine∈E′sze(t) for
general set of Ces. It is obvious that
∑
e zes(t) ≥ t for all
s = 1, ..., S. In the worst case, we have
∑
e zes(t) = t. In the
Step 4 in the Algorithm 2, it iteratively solves the following
integer linear programm (LP).
max κ
s.t.
S∑
s=1
zes(t)Ces ≥ κ, e = 1, ..., n,
N∑
i=1
zes(t) ≤ t, s = 1, ..., S,
zes(t) ∈ N, ∀i, s.
(28)
The aim of this LP is that distributing the t probing of
each source-destination pair s to evenly cover the links to
maximize the minimum link sample size
∑S
s=1 zes(t)Ces.
Particulary, we consider the minimum link sample size for
source-destination pair s′, i.e., mine∈E′s
∑S
s=1 zes(t)Ces. De-
note the maximum value of the LP (28) by κ∗. Note that
zes(t) = ⌊t/ks⌋Ces is a feasible solution to (28). Thus,
mine∈Esze(t) ≥ κ∗ ≥ mine∈Es
∑S
s=1 ⌊t/ks⌋Ces
∆
=κ (t).
Actually, normalized κ (t) to κ¯ =
∑t
t=1 κ (t) /t, which
is the average probing rate up to time slot t. The AOSPR-
CP-EXP3++ Algorithm needs to use in the link probability
calculation of (7). Under the complete overlap of paths over
the entire network, i.e., Ces ≡ 1 and ks ≡ n, we have
κ¯ = S = m. Following the same line of analysis, the
regret upper bounds in Theorem 8-Theorem 13 hold for the
AOSPR-CP-EXP3++ algorithm in the multi-source accelerated
learning case by replacing m with S. In the absence of any
overlap, i.e.,
∑S
s=1 Ces ≡ 1, we have the probing rate κ¯ = 1.
This correspond to the single source-destination case, and the
now Theorem 1-Theorem 7 hold for the AOSPR-CP-EXP3++
algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 17.
Proof: To analysis the deviation of regret R(t) to m∆ and
n∆ in the adversarial regime, we need to focus on the fol-
lowing function f (m,n, ˜̺t(e)) =
∑n
e=1
˜̺t(e)
˜̺t(e)+(1− ˜̺t(e))m−1n−1
subject to ∑ne=1 ˜̺t(e) = 1. The corresponding Lagrangian is:
L (m,n, ˜̺t(e)) =
∑n
e=1
˜̺t(e)
ρt(e)+(1− ˜̺t(e))m−1n−1
+λ (1−∑ne=1 ˜̺t(e)) .
As shown in [19], ˜̺t(e) = 1n , ∀e ∈ [1, n] is the only maximizer
of f (m,n, ˜̺t(e)).
At first, take the first derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to m we get
∂L(m,n, ˜̺t(e))
∂m
∣∣∣
˜̺t(e)=
1
n
=
n∑
e=1
− ˜̺t(e)(1− ˜̺t(e)) 1n−1
( ˜̺t(e)+(1− ˜̺t(e))m−1n−1 )
2 = − n2m2 .
We can make the first order approximation,
i.e., f (m+m∆, n, ˜̺t(e)) ≃ f (m,n, ˜̺t(e)) +
m∆
∂L(m,n, ˜̺t(e))
∂m
∣∣∣
˜̺t(e)=
1
n
= f (m,n, ˜̺t(e)) − n2m2m∆.
Then, according to (22) and (23). We have the deviated
version of regret in (24) as
R(t) ≤ 2k
(
n
m − n
2m∆
m2
) t∑
s=1
ηs + k
lnn
ηt
≤ 4k
√
t
(
n
m − n
2m∆
m2
)
lnn.
Make the first order approximation of the upper bound of
R(t), i.e., R¯(t), around nm we get the Rm∆(t) is
1
2m∆
n
m R¯(t).
Use similar approach we get the result for adaptive jammer is
1
3m∆
n
m R¯(t). Combine the two, we prove the part (a) of the
Theorem 17.
To prove the part (b) of the theorem, let us view the proof of
the upper bound of R(t) in the stochastic regime in (27). Take
a first order approximation of m∆ on the leading term 1m (as
a function), we easily get the Rm∆(t) = 12 m∆m R¯(t). Similarly,
the results hold in the contaminated stochastic regimes.
The result (c) in the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime
straightforward, which is just a combination of the results in
adversarial and stochastic regimes.
Secondly, take the first derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to n we get
∂L(m,n, ˜̺t(e))
∂n
∣∣∣
˜̺t(e)=
1
n
=
n∑
e=1
˜̺t(e)(1− ˜̺t(e)) m−1
(n−1)2
( ˜̺t(e)+(1− ˜̺t(e))m−1n−1 )
2 =
n2
m2
m−1
n−1 .
Let us take the first order approximation,
i.e., f (m,n+ n∆, ˜̺t(e)) ≃ f (m,n, ˜̺t(e)) +
n∆
∂L(m,n, ˜̺t(e))
∂n
∣∣∣
˜̺t(e)=
1
n
= f (m,n, ˜̺t(e)) + n∆
n2
m2
m−1
n−1 .
Then, according to (22) and (23). We have the deviated
version of regret in (24) as
R(t) ≤ 2k
(
n
m + n∆
n2
m2
m−1
n−1
) t∑
s=1
ηs + k
lnn
ηt
≤ 4k
√
t
(
n
m + n∆
n2
m2
m−1
n−1
)
lnn.
Make the first order approximation of the upper bound of R(t),
i.e., R¯(t), around nm we get the Rm∆(t) is
1
2n∆
n
m
m−1
n−1 R¯(t) ≃
1
2n∆R¯(t). Use similar approach we get the result for adaptivejammer is 13n∆R¯(t). Combine the two, we prove the part (d)
of the Theorem 17.
To prove the part (e) of the theorem, let us view the proof of
the upper bound of R(t) in the stochastic regime in (27). Take
a first order approximation of n∆ on the leading regret term.
Since there is no estimated value of n in (7), we easily get the
Rm∆(t) = 0. Similarly, the results hold in the contaminated
stochastic regimes.
The result (f) in the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime
straightforward, which is just a combination of the results in
adversarial and stochastic regimes.
Proof of Theorem 18.
Proof: The delayed regret upper bounds results of The-
orem 18 comes from the general results for adversarial and
stochastic MABs in the respective Theorem 1 and Theorem 6
in [22]. The regret upper bound under delayed feedback in the
adversarial regime is proved by a simple Black-Box transfor-
mation in a non-delayed oblivious MAB environment, which
is a general result. For the stochastic regimes (contaminated
regimes, etc.), we need to study the following high probability
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bounds (19)
E[Nt(e)] ≤ (t∗ − 1) +
t∑
τ=t∗
e−bτ + k
t∑
τ=t∗
ετ (e)1{Eet }
+
t∑
τ=t∗
e−ητhτ−1(e),
again. In the delayed-feedback setting, if we use upper confi-
dence bounds Ees(t) instead of Eet , where s(t) was defined to be
the number of rewards of link e observed up to and including
time instant t. In the same way as above we can write
E[Nt(e)] ≤ (t∗ − 1) +
t∑
τ=t∗
e−bτ + k
t∑
τ=t∗
ετ (e)1{Ee
s(t)
}
+
t∑
τ=t∗
e−ητhτ−1(e).
(29)
Since Nt−1(e) = τ∗ + St−1(e), we get
E[Nt(e)] ≤ τ∗ + (t∗ − 1) +
t∑
τ=t∗
e−bτ +k
t∑
τ=t∗
ετ (e)1{Ee
s(t)
}
+
t∑
τ=t∗
e−ητhτ−1(e).
(30)
Now the same concentration inequalities used to bound (29) in
the analysis of the non-delayed setting can be used to upper
bound the expected value of the sum in (30). By the same
technique, the result holds for other stochastic regimes.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we propose the first adaptive online SPR
algorithm, which can automatically detect the feature of the
environment and achieve almost optimal learning performance
in all different regimes. We have conducted extensive ex-
periments to verify the flexibility of our algorithm and have
seen performance improvements over classic approaches. We
also considered many practical implementation issues to make
our algorithm more useful and computationally efficient in
practice. Our algorithm can be especially useful for sensor,
ad hoc and military networks in dynamic environments. In the
near future, we plan to extend our model to mobile networks
and networks with node failure and inaccessibility to gain
more insight into the learnability of the online SPR algorithm.
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